EMC 27: "Seelow Heights"
In the summer of 1997, major flooding threatened to breach the dams of the Oder in an area known as the Oderbruch. The events captured a lot of media attention and the german armed forces commited substantial resources to battling the floods, and eventually, most of the dams held. However, this struggle took place on historical grounds, the largest battlefield of World War 2 on german soil. For it was on the Seelow Heights, a ridge overlooking the Oderbruch, that in April 1945 german armed forces also fought against a different flood, the Red Army.
During February and March, the Soviets had advanced to the Oder and established several bridgeheads where a front stabilized.
In anticipation of the final soviet offensive, the german defenders had established defensive positions.
The heaviest concentration was opposite the Kuestrin bridgehead on the Seelow heights, where the 9th Army under General Busse concentrated the remaining defensive assets - mostly worn-out army units and Volkssturm.
Supporting the soviet army was the 16th Air Army, with more than 3000 aircraft assigned to support the operation. On the Luftwaffe side roughly 300 aircraft from JG52 and 54 as well as StG2 opposed them, nevertheless, they managed to play an important part, StG2 alone, under command of Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel, was credited with about 150 tanks destroyed during the battle.
When the soviets attacked on April 16th, most of the german defenders evaded the preceding barrage by pulling back from the positions on the river onto the overlooking heights. The soviet push extended from their bridgehead at Kuestrin, opposite the Seelow Heights, and the plan called for a quick breakthrough, the usual practice and a direct copy from german Blitzkrieg tactics of the early years. However, when the attack broke before dawn, the soviet push quickly bogged down in the face of extensive minefield and a rugged defense by german defenders who had not been subjected to artillery bombardment.
At this point, Zhukov committed a major tactical error and commited his armor to the battle. Without coordination with the infantry and crossing marshes that restricted tanks to the roads, the armored attack turned into a gigantic traffic jam and heavy losses were incurred upon them, and by the end of the first day, no less than 200 soviet tanks had been destroyed while the german positions remained intact.
Renewed attacks during the following days finally broke the german line, but in the end, the soviets had payed a high price for defeating an already beaten enemy. The soviet figures, doubtlessly much lower than actual losses, account for the loss of 30.000 men, 700 tanks and several hundred aircraft in the four days of fighting.
